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FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS ECÓNOMICAS, ADMINISTRATIVAS Y CONTABLES

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Presentación

Desde el Observatorio Colombiano de tratados Comerciales (OCTC), nos complacemos en presentarles la novena edición de nuestro boletín semestral.

En este boletín se recogen artículos que analizan los impactos que ha tenido la pandemia en el comercio y las relaciones internacionales, ocupándose los dos primeros de la incidencia de la crisis en los aspectos logísticos, que ha significado una reconfiguración forzada de las Cadenas Internacionales de Suministro y que han permitido además un reacomodamiento en las Cadenas Globales de Valor. Los últimos dos artículos se ocupan fundamentalmente del papel que China ha jugado en estos cambios, así también como del futuro de las relaciones de Colombia con la potencia emergente.

Esperamos que este boletín sea de particular interés para comprender lo que está pasando con el comercio mundial en este momento coyuntural, y también para clarificar los desafíos que enfrenta el sector externo colombiano en un contexto de mucha incertidumbre y volatilidad.

ACERCA DE NOSOTROS

El OBSERVATORIO COLOMBIANO DE TRATADOS COMERCIALES (OCTC) fue creado en el 2014 bajo la necesidad de analizar la integración económica de Colombia en el marco de los acuerdos comerciales suscritos. Este surge del trabajo conjunto entre la Línea de Investigación Institucional en Globalización y Desarrollo Sostenible (GDS), dirigida por Jenny Paola Danna-Buitrago y la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Contables de la Fundación Universitaria Los Libertadores, en cabeza de Álvaro Luis Mercado Suárez.

Objetivo general del OCTC

Proveer información sobre la economía colombiana a diferentes niveles (empresarial, sectorial, regional, departamental y nacional), en relación a los países con los que Colombia tiene acuerdos comerciales suscritos o en proceso de negociación, a partir de la cual los principales actores (gobierno, gremios, empresas, comunidad académica) definan estrategias, basen sus decisiones y fundamenten sus estudios.

Objetivos específicos

- Medir la competitividad de los sectores designados como estratégicos por las entidades gubernamentales, mediante la utilización de indicadores sintéticos tales como el de Ventajas Comparativas Reveladas.
- Medir los efectos en términos socioeconómicos (balanza comercial, empleo, producción, precios), mediante modelos de tipo gravitacional, econométricos y de equilibrio general, entre otros.
- Generar informes de coyuntura, boletines y bases de datos sobre comercio internacional.
- Identificar las zonas óptimas de competitividad por sector, productos o rama de actividad, con el fin de proponer un direccionamiento estratégico para futuros acuerdos comerciales que podrían ser negociados.

Misión

El Observatorio Colombiano de Tratados Comerciales (OCTC) es una unidad de investigación que direcciona sus esfuerzos en solventar los cuestionamientos que genera el intercambio de bienes y servicios y la movilidad de factores a la luz de los tratados de libre comercio y demás acuerdos comerciales celebrados por Colombia y/o en proceso de negociación.

Visión

Posicionarnos al 2020 como referente nacional en el análisis y generación de conocimiento sobre la inserción económica internacional de Colombia que sirvan para la elaboración de planes, proyectos y políticas, tanto públicos como privados encaminados al aprovechamiento de los beneficios del libre comercio.

NUESTRO EQUIPO DE TRABAJO

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En la actualidad es profesor de tiempo completo y Director del Observatorio Colombiano de Tratados Comerciale, de la Fundación universitaria Los Libertadores. Hace parte del Grupo Reflexión Económica, Administrativa y Contable (Categoría A - Colciencias) de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Administrativas y Contables.

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Jenny Paola Danna-Buitrago

Investigadora de OCTC.

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Se especializa en temas de economía colombiana y economía internacional, estadística, investigación, ecuaciones estructurales, macroeconomía, uso de datos cualitativos y técnicas de análisis cuantitativo. Estos conocimientos le han permitido efectuar análisis de dinámicas socio-económicas de Colombia - producción, crecimiento, desarrollo rural/urbano, pobreza y desigualdades - desde el punto de vista de la integración del país a los flujos internacionales.

Además, es Investigadora Junior (IJ) ante Colciencias y miembro del grupo Reflexión Económica y Contable (Categoría A - Colciencias) de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Administrativas y Contables de la Fundación Universitaria Los Libertadores. Actualmente, se desempeña como Directora de Investigación en la Fundación los Libertadores.

CO-INVESTIGADORES

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Licenciado en Ciencias Sociales de la Universidad Pedagógica Nacional. Economista de la Universidad Nacional de Colombia, institución en la que realizó sus estudios de maestría y doctorado de Ciencias Económicas. Es Research Scholar de la Universidad de Chicago. Tiene un postdoctorado en la Universidad Libre de Ámsterdam donde realizó la investigación "Perceived quality of private education and fears of stratification: Investigating the propositions of human capital theory by exploring the case of Colombia", en la que analiza la calidad de la educación superior en Colombia y las posibilidades de discriminación en el Mercado laboral. Actualmente es docente de tiempo completo de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Administrativas y Contables de la Fundación Universitaria Los Libertadores en las asisgnaturas microeconomía y macroeconomía aplicada. Ha publicado libros de texto en microeconomía, finanzas públicas y políticas económica. Sus intereses investigativos se centran en los aspectos críticos de la globalización. Sus publicaciones científicas versan sobre teoría económica, seguridad alimentaria, pobreza y desarrollo, necesidades básicas, bienes básicos y subdesarrollo y en aquellas áreas en las que la globalización ha resultado especialmente nociva para los países del tercer mundo.

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En la actualidad, es Directora del Centro de Investigaciones Económicas y Empresariales y Directora del Observatorio de Competitividad Empresarial de la Fundación Universitaria Los Libertadores. Hace parte del Grupo Reflexión Económica, Administrativa y Contable (Categoría A – Colciencias) de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Administrativas y Contables. Es Docente Investigadora con más de seis años de experiencia en Educación Universitaria en temas relacionados con análisis económico, gestión empresarial, competitividad, innovación, emprendimiento, responsabilidad social empresarial, diagnóstico empresarial y finanzas corporativas.

EL ENCALLAMIENTO DEL MV EVER GIVEN: UNA VISIÓN DESDE LA GEOPOLÍTICA



Soren Héctor de Velasco Galván

El autor es Licenciado en Administración de Empresas y Maestro en Ciencia Económicas y Administrativas, egresado, en ambos casos, de la Universidad Autónoma de Aguascalientes. Asimismo, realizó cursos de especialización en Relaciones Internacionales en la London School of Economics. Es coordinador de la Academia de Logística y Comercio en la dirección de Desarrollo de Negocios y Agricultura de la Universidad Tecnológica del Norte de Aguascalientes (UTNA).

THE GROUNDING OF MV EVER GIVEN: A VISION FROM GEOPOLITICS

Resumen

El encallamiento del buque portacontenedores MV Ever Given provocó un embotellamiento en una de las principales vías de infraestructura física: el Canal de Suez. Este hecho aunado a la competencia entre los Estados Unidos de América, por un parte, y la República Popular de China y la Federación Rusa, por otra, resalta la importancia que la interacción entre la estrategia, la geopolítica y la infraestructura física ejercen sobre las cadenas de suministro.

Abstract

The grounding of the container ship MV Ever Given provoked a jam in one of the main ways of physical infrastructure: the Suez Canal. This fact together with the competition between the United States of America, on the one hand, and the People`s Republic of China and the Russian Federation, on the other hand, underlines the importance that the interaction between strategy, geopolitics and physical infrastructure exert on supply chains.

Palabras clave:

Geopolítica, Canal de Suez, infraestructura física, cadenas de suministro.

Key words:

Geopolitics, the Suez Canal, physical infrastructure, supply chains.

I. Introducción

A. La geopolítica

A finales del siglo XIX, Friedrich Ratzel acuñó el término de geografía política, la cual estudia a la Nación-Estado como un organismo que ocupa un lugar en el espacio. Es decir, para Ratzel hay dos determinantes en la fortuna de los Estados: el espacio y la posición- (Kaplan, 2012).

Posteriormente, Rudolf Kjellén definió la geopolítica como la ciencia que concibe a la Nación-Estado como un organismo geográfico o como un fenómeno en el espacio. Kjellén, basándose en las ideas de Charles Darwin, creía que la Nación-Estado estaba envuelta en una lucha perpetua por la vida y el espacio, y sólo los más aptos y los más adaptables podían sobrevivir y prosperar (Khanna, 2008)

En la postrimería del siglo XIX y el principio del XX surgió la geopolítica clásica, la cual se dividió en dos escuelas de pensamiento: primero, en Alemania, después de la derrota de la Primera Guerra Mundial, un grupo de geógrafos propusieron la aplicación de la geopolítica como la base para un plan sistemático para la recuperación no sólo de Alemania sino para el retorno de su nación como una gran potencia (Parker, 1985).

El representante más preclaro de la geopolítica germana fue Karl Haushofer quien, junto con sus compañeros de la Revista de Geopolítica, delineó una estrategia para el resurgimiento de Alemania mediante la adquisición del Lebensraum –"Espacio vital" en alemán. Para los geopolitólogos germanos, la región denominada Mitteleuropa, un término tanto geográfico como político para denominar una Europa Central dominada por Alemania, era requisito para convertirse en una potencia mundial (Brechtefeld, 1996; Brzezinski, 1997).

Mientras que los geopolitólogos teutones se enfocaban en los problemas de Europa Central, en el Reino Unido y en los Estados Unidos surgió la perspectiva global de la geopolítica. A finales del siglo XIX, Alfred Thayer Mahan propuso, basado en sus estudios de las Guerras Púnicas y de la historia naval británica, que el control del mar era indispensable para la seguridad y la prosperidad de las grandes potencias (Zimmermann, 2004).

Para Mahan, una potencia naval, como su país, tendría ventaja sobre una potencia terrestre si seguía la siguiente fórmula:

> *Aproximarse al sistema global como un juego de suma cero en el cual los Estados Unidos debía competir; excluir a los rivales donde quiera que fuera posible; crear monopolios comerciales con autoridad colonial; establecer una red global de bases que permitiera a la flota operar con impunidad en cualquier parte del mundo; mantener una armada tecnológicamente avanzada y, sobre todo, poseer la habilidad de controlar el mar a voluntad. (Stavridis, 2020, p. 102-103)*

Simultáneamente, Julian Corbett propugnaba la importancia del poderío marítimo en el resultado de las conflagraciones. La primacía en este ámbito podría lograrse mediante el ataque y la defensa del comercio marítimo, la cadena de suministro de las fuerzas expedicionarias, el uso de las operaciones anfibias, los bloqueos navales, y la influencia que los avances tecnológicos ejercerían en el ámbito náutico (Herman, 2004; Heuser, 2010).

El otro tema para los geopolitólogos anglosajones era Eurasia –el conjunto de Europa y Asia. En 1904, Halford J. Mackinder impartió una cátedra intitulada "El Pivote Geográfico de la Historia", en la disertación, Mackinder hizo notar que las máquinas de vapor y el canal de Suez habían incrementado la movilidad del poderío naval en comparación con el poderío terrestre. Mackinder aseveraba que quien dominara el "Heartland", el corazón de Asia, sería capaz de dominar el planeta entero. Para evitar que esto sucediera, la potencia marítima preeminente, el Reino Unido, debía evitar que, en su expansión, la Rusia zarista tomara posesión de Arabia y del canal de Suez ((Kaplan, 2012; Meyer, 2003).

Durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial, Nicholas J. Spykman propuso una variante a la tesis del "Heartland". Spykman sostenía que los verdaderos centros de poder no estaban en el centro sino en un gran cinturón alrededor de la periferia de Eurasia, al cual denominó el "Rimland". El dominio de esta región, debido a sus recursos físicos y humanos, estaba en el interés tanto de las potencias marítimas como terrestres (Greiling, 2020; Kaplan, 2012).

Para Spykman, un Estado ruso que abarcara desde los Urales hasta el mar del Norte no era preferible a un Estado alemán que se extendiera desde el mar del Norte hasta los Urales. Por lo tanto, Spykman recomendaba una alianza de las potencias del "Rimland" contra las potencias que ocupaban el "Heartland": China y Rusia (Greiling, 2020; Kaplan, 2012).

Después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, surgió la denominada nueva geopolítica, la cual hacía una crítica del rol de la Nación-Estado en la solución de los problemas globales y se enfoca en los siguientes temas: la pobreza, el subdesarrollo, la contaminación ambiental, el deterioro ecológico, la gestión de los recursos naturales, y, por último, la persistencia de la guerra como el instrumento supremo de política pública (Kaplan, 2002).

Sin embargo, a finales del siglo XX, Eurasia volvió a aparecer en el discurso geopolítico merced a un representante de la escuela anglosajona:

Eurasia es el continente más grande del globo y su eje geopolítico. Una potencia que domine Eurasia controlaría dos de las tres regiones más productivas y económicamente más avanzadas del mundo. Eurasia es, por lo tanto, el tablero de ajedrez sobre el cual la lucha por la primacía global continúa siendo jugada. (Brzezinski, 1997, p. 31)

B. El Canal de Suez

Durante el antiguo Egipto, los faraones habían construido una conducción entre el río Nilo y el mar Rojo. Luego, en 1869 se inauguró el canal de Suez, un proyecto franco-egipcio que conectaba los mares Mediterráneo y Rojo. Este designio de infraestructura física revolucionó la economía mundial, pues redujo la distancia entre Inglaterra y la India -entonces colonia británica, en más de seis mil kilómetros. Para los británicos, el canal de Suez era tan importante como el río Támesis. Por ello, compraron las acciones de la compañía que operaba el canal y, luego, ocuparon con tropas Egipto, al cual convirtieron en un estado vasallo desde 1882 hasta 1954 (Meyer y Blair Brysac, 2009).

Durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial, la Alemania nazi y la Italia fascista amenazaron el señorío británico sobre el canal de Suez: en julio de 1942, las tropas germano-italianas, lideradas por Erwin Rommel, llegaron a 90 kilómetros de Alejandría, lo cual provocó el caos entre los británicos. Sin embargo, Rommel fue derrotado en la batalla de El-Alamein y, posteriormente, las fuerzas del Eje expulsadas de África del Norte (Kershaw, 2007; Roberts, 2009; Stephens, 1973).

En 1952, los líderes de la Sociedad de los Oficiales Libres, Gamal Abdel Nasser y Anwar el-Sadat, derrocaron a la monarquía y delinearon dos objetivos: liberar a Egipto de la tutela británica y convertirlo en el guía del mundo árabe. El primer objetivo se logró en 1954, con la retirada británica de la zona del canal de Suez. El 26 de julio de 1956, Nasser nacionalizó el canal de Suez. En respuesta, el primer ministro británico, Anthony Eden, calificó la acción como "un atraco" y, junto con Francia e Israel, urdió un plan para invadir Egipto y recuperar el dominio sobre el conducto marítimo. La operación castrense anglo-francesa, con el apoyo israelí, fracasó por dos motivos: los Estados Unidos no apoyaron la acometida; y la Rusia soviética amenazó con utilizar armas atómicas contra los agresores (Kissinger, 1995; Stephens, 1973).

La debacle anglo-francesa tuvo las siguientes consecuencias geopolíticas:

> *El fin de la supremacía británica en el área central del Medio Oriente y trajo a los Estados Unidos y a Rusia cara a cara en una región donde los árabes buscaban "llenar el vacío" entre ellos; aceleró la retirada británica del imperio y apresuró el proceso de descolonización a través del mundo, especialmente en África. (Stephens, 1973, p. 246-247)*

Debido a la rivalidad árabe-israelí, el canal de Suez permaneció cerrado entre 1967 y 1975 Fue hasta el año 2014 cuando el presidente de Egipto, Abdelfatah al Sisi, se decidió por la ampliación del conducto. El engrandecimiento se terminó un año después y el canal recuperó su preponderancia porque el 10 por ciento del comercio mundial transita por sus aguas (Rabinovich, 2004).

II. Desarrollo

A. El encallamiento del **MV Ever Given**

El 23 de marzo de 2021 el buque portacontenedores MV Ever Given, propiedad de una compañía de Taiwán y que enarbola bandera de Panamá, cruzaba el canal de Suez cuando fue azotado por ráfagas de viento de hasta 70 kilómetros por hora. Gradualmente, el buque quedó atrapado a mitad del canal. En cuestión de minutos, se registró un embotellamiento marítimo porque más de 300 buques se encontraron impedidos de atravesar la arteria.

El encallamiento del MV Ever Given ocurrió en el contexto de una serie de eventos en la política internacional: la reunión virtual de los líderes de Australia, los Estados Unidos, la India, y el Japón (12 de marzo); el mandatario estadounidense, Joe Biden, declaró que su homólogo, Vladimir Putin, es "un asesino" (17 de marzo); la primera reunión formal entre altos funcionarios chinos y estadounidenses, la cual se caracterizó por el lenguaje hostil entre ambas partes (20 y 21 de marzo); el conclave entre los cancilleres de la República Popular de China y la Federación Rusa (23 de marzo) y, finalmente, el cenáculo de los ministros de Asuntos Exteriores de la Organización del Tratado del Atlántico Norte (OTAN) (22 al 25 de marzo).

B. Repercusiones geopolíticas

El atascamiento del MV Ever Given fue percibido como una oportunidad geopolítica por China y Rusia. Rosatom, la empresa pública encargada de la regulación del complejo atómico ruso, declaró, que si se empleaba el canal de Suez, se corría el riesgo de atascarse y que la mejor alternativa era utilizar la Ruta del océano Ártico (Nilsen, March 25, 2021)

La Ruta del océano Ártico, la cual reduce en un 40 por ciento el tiempo entre Asia y Europa y tiene menores costos de transporte, corre principalmente a lo largo de la costa de Rusia. Por ello, los rusos tienen previsto que, debido al calentamiento global, para el año 2040 se podrá navegar durante las cuatro estaciones y, posiblemente, en dos décadas más el hielo ya no cubrirá el Polo Norte. Para tal efecto, desde el año 2014 se anunció la creación de un sistema de bases navales para el Ártico (Katusa 2015; Stavridis, 2018).

Para subrayar su oferta como proveedor confiable en materia de rutas marítimas y de seguridad, el 26 de marzo de 2021, el Ministerio de Defensa publicó un video de unas maniobras militares previamente planeadas, en donde tres submarinos nucleares rusos emergen simultáneamente de la capa de hielo y nieve del océano Ártico y de dos aviones caza MIG-31 siendo reabastecidos de combustible sobre el Polo Norte (Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, 2021).

El mensaje es claro:

> El Alto Norte es un pilar central de la cosmogonía de la Federación Rusa. También tiene la mayor población ártica (cerca de 4 millones) y la mejor infraestructura. Rusia ve la promesa del Ártico con gran claridad geopolítica y maniobrará para ser un jugador dominante. (Stavridis, 2018, p. 247)

Por su parte, la República Popular de China y la República Islámica de Irán suscribieron, el día 27 de marzo de 2021, un acuerdo de cooperación estratégica. La firma del convenio coincidió con el encallamiento del MV Ever Given.

Estos dos eventos reforzaron la renuencia china de utilizar rutas marítimas porque la zona comprendida entre el Canal de Suez y la ciudad de Shanghái es un área clave en la lucha geopolítica y geoeconómica del mundo contemporáneo porque actúa como la puerta geográfica entre las diversas potencias continentales y costeras de Eurasia. (Rogers, 2009).

La reluctancia china se debe a dos cuestiones: primero, el mar de la China meridional tiene un significado geopolítico único porque conecta a los océanos Índico y Pacífico. Además, es una zona donde las potencias marítimas luchan por dominar las vías marítimas de comunicación (Kaplan, 2014; Stavridis, 2018).

La disputa por el mar de la China meridional ya había sido prevista desde la época de la Segunda Guerra Mundial:

> China será una potencia continental de dimensiones enormes en control del litoral de ese mar medio. Su posición geográfica será similar a la de los Estados Unidos en lo que respecta al Mediterráneo americano. Cuando China sea fuerte, su penetración económica en esa región tendrá matices políticos. Es posible contemplar el día en que este cuerpo de agua será controlado no por el poderío naval británico, estadounidense o japonés sino por el poderío aéreo chino. (Spykman, 1944, p. 460 y 469)

Segundo, el océano Índico es donde la competencia de China contra los Estados Unidos y la India se entrelaza. A este hecho se suma la rivalidad entre la India y Pakistán. Esto hace que el océano Índico sea un vector crucial en las tendencias geopolíticas (Kaplan, 2010; Stavridis, 2018).

Actualmente, China es el principal socio comercial de 124 países. Este hecho ha convertido al país asiático en el centro global de gravedad porque la mayor parte de las cadenas de suministro –el ecosistema de productores, distribuidores y vendedores que transforma la materia prima en bienes y servicios- convergen allí. Por lo tanto, la posibilidad de que una potencia hostil ataque o controle puntos geográficos tales como los estrechos de Bab el-Mandeb, Hormuz, y Malaca o infraestructura física como el canal de Suez es un problema estratégico (Brzezinski, 1997; Khanna, 2016).

Para atenuar esta desventaja, China ha implementado la Iniciativa de la Franja y la Ruta, también conocida como "la Nueva Ruta de la Seda", la cual fomenta la conectividad de Eurasia mediante la construcción de infraestructura física - autopistas, líneas férreas y gasoductos- que conecten a China, a través de Rusia e Irán, con los mercados potenciales en Asia Central, Europa y el Medio Oriente (Khanna 2008 y 2016; Winter, 2020).

En este contexto:

> La construcción china y europea de redes de ferrocarril de alta velocidad está comprimiendo los viajes en tren en Eurasia a días en vez de meses. El transporte ferroviario es más rápido que el marítimo y más barato que el aéreo, afectando el liderazgo del transporte marítimo en volumen y del aéreo en valor. (Khanna, 2016, p. 199)

III. Conclusión

El encallamiento del MV Ever Given por sí solo hubiera ingresado al anecdotario de la historia naval. Sin embargo, la disputa geopolítica que libran los Estados Unidos de América contra la República Popular de China y la Federación Rusa le otorgaron otra dimensión porque retoma las teorías de la geopolítica clásica, en lo que respecta a la lucha entre una potencia marítima contra dos potencias terrestres. Asimismo, este accidente náutico resalta la interrelación entre la infraestructura física, la estrategia y la geopolítica. Finalmente, esto es una lección que América Latina, en general, y México, en particular, no deben soslayar. Especialmente este país porque actualmente está llevando a cabo dos grandes designios de infraestructura física que tienen una connotación geopolítica: el proyecto del Istmo de Tehuantepec y el Tren Maya.

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FACTORES DE RIESGO EN EL TRANSPORTE GLOBAL INTERMODAL DE MERCANCÍAS

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Introducción

Las cadenas globales de suministro eficientes y seguras contribuyen a la mejora de la competitividad de los productos comercializados en los mercados internacionales al reducir sus costos y el tiempo de entrega al tiempo que aumenta la fiabilidad y la seguridad. Las cadenas de suministro globales son impensables sin la integración del transporte de mercancías, que generalmente se logra a través de la estrategia del sistema de transporte Intermodal. El contenedor «freight container o shipping container» es la Unidad de Transporte de Carga (UTC) por excelencia del transporte intermodal. Sus características técnicas lo hacen apto para el transporte por carretera, ferroviario, marítimo, fluvial y lacustre, hecho que lo convierte en la UTC más empleada a nivel global. En consecuencia, los sistemas de transporte intermodal de mercancías son mucho más complejos que los sistemas unimodales y multimodales debido al número de partes interesadas que interactúan, incluida la infraestructura y procesos logísticos de transferencia modal, que en caso de una mala planificación y coordinación puede conducir a un aumento en lo que respecta a la vulnerabilidad de la cadena de transporte.

Así, el principal desafío en el funcionamiento de las operaciones de transporte intermodal en las cadenas globales de suministro es aumentar su eficiencia teniendo en cuenta los problemas que generan los riesgos asociados. Las iniciativas actuales en materia de identificación y gestión de riesgos en las cadenas intermodales de transporte no proporcionan una imagen completa y clara de la magnitud y complejidad a las que estas cadenas están expuestas. Por su naturaleza, el transporte intermodal de mercancías es más complejo que el transporte unimodal y que el multimodal, ya que se utilizan más formas de transporte, que son generalmente controladas por un mayor número de diferentes participantes; la estructura de transporte es más diverso y complejo (requiere de puntos de transbordo o interfaces), lo que demanda de procesos más robustos y relaciones mutuas de los participantes en la cadena intermodal de transporte.

Al tener un mayor número de participantes, "conexiones y nodos" en la cadena, mayor es la probabilidad de que ocurra un evento no deseado y, por tanto, los riesgos a los que tales cadenas están expuestos también aumentan. El hecho de que en una cadena de transporte intermodal interactúan varios procesos, que deben ser realizados sucesivamente por diferentes participantes, conduce a una significativa disminución de la eficiencia operativa, lo que se manifiesta en un mayor tiempo total de las entregas, y en la reducción de la flexibilidad y fiabilidad de estas. Por tanto, el principal desafío en la planificación, organización y gestión de las cadenas intermodales de transporte de mercancías es el aumentar la eficiencia, lo que resulta en la búsqueda constante de nuevos métodos para resolver el desafío mencionado. En este contexto, es necesario tener en cuenta y reconsiderar más de cerca el tema del riesgo, que entre otros, puede aparecer como consecuencia de iniciativas para mejorar la eficiencia de la cadena de transporte.

El riesgo en una cadena de transporte intermodal de mercancías se define con mayor frecuencia como eventos que tienen un impacto adverso en la cadena en el sentido de provocar retrasos, interrupciones, disrupciones, perturbaciones o ruptura total en la realización de todo el proceso. Por tanto, disipar los riesgos a los que está expuesta una cadena intermodal es bastante amplio, y varía de manera extensa des-de perturbaciones dentro de un proceso o un miembro de la cadena, a catástrofes naturales que pueden provocar la interrupción de toda la cadena. El riesgo es uno de los factores básicos o primordiales (además de los costos, la protección ambiental y actitud de los usuarios) que influyen en la elección del servicio de transporte.

El concepto de riesgo de una cadena de transporte intermodal se puede definir como la exposición a diferentes eventos que tienen un efecto adverso en la capacidad operativa de la cadena intermodal y, por tanto, sus prestaciones, como el nivel de servicio a los usuarios finales, los costos o la posibilidad de respuesta. Los riesgos de la cadena intermodal representan todo lo que puede poner en peligro la capacidad de la cadena en el cumplimiento de sus objetivos; el espectro de eventos de riesgo pueden tener un im-pacto negativo en la capacidad operativa de la cadena.

En efecto, el transporte de mercancías es una actividad cargada de riesgos; cada vez que se mueve un envío existe el riesgo de que se produzca una interrupción del transporte, es decir, cualquier retraso, interrupción o parada significativa en el flujo de comercio causado por un desastre natural, mayor nivel de amenaza, un acto de terrorismo, o cualquier incidente de seguridad. Por tanto, el remitente como en el del transportista deben desarrollar una perfecta sincronía de sus desafíos para mover la carga de manera rápida y segura. Los problemas surgen cuando la amenaza de interrupciones y peligros del transporte se vuelven realidad y la cadena de transporte intermodal se ve afectada negativamente.

Dada la amplia gama de problemas que pueden ocurrir cuando la carga fluye a lo largo de la cadena inter-modal de transporte, sería más que difícil y complejo identificar cada uno de los riesgos potenciales. La pérdida de la mercancía, daño de la mercancía, contaminación de la mercancía, retraso en la entrega, disrupción en la cadena de suministro e inseguridad, son los principales riesgos relacionados con el transporte intermodal de mercancías. Es de anotar que los problemas específicos dentro de cada categoría de riesgo variarán por tipo de organización, modo principal utilizado y medio (tierra-mar-aire) por donde transita la mercancía.

A continuación se explica cada uno de l os riesgos mencionados:

I. Pérdidas

• El robo de artículos individuales de una estiba por parte de estibadores y operadores de equipos (personal de cuello azul) y/o por el personal administrativo (personal de cuello blanco) al alterar la existencias reales de las mercancías.

• Arrojar todo o parte de la carga por la borda del buque o barcaza cuando la carga se transporta por los modos marítimo-fluvial/lacustre si es necesario salvar la tripulación. Lo anterior, debido a peligros ocasionados por el clima extremo, encallamiento, incendio o naufrago en el buque (Figura 1) o barcaza.

• Piratería y secuestro, no solo son riesgos de pérdida de productos y equipos, pues crean pérdidas financieras para las organizaciones, y a menudo ponen en riesgo de ser secuestrados, heridos o asesinados a las tripulaciones de los diferentes modos de transporte.

Figura 1. Incendio a bordo del buque en tránsito internacional. Fuente: © HYUNDAI; Google ©℠™®

II. Daños

El daño a la mercancía es un peligro potencial y es un riesgo muy costoso, que surge cada vez que un embarque es manejado inadecuadamente. Los riesgos de daños incluyen:

- La falta de atención, negligencia y la falta de personal capacitado contribuyen a este tipo de riesgo. Mercancías dañadas pueden necesitar ser reparadas o seleccionadas para recuperar algún valor, o descartarlas de manera definitiva, incurriendo en una pérdida total. El costo del embarque, el pro-ceso del reclamo y el reemplazo de la mercancía se suman al impacto financiero del daño.

- Maniobrabilidad deficiente de las Unidades de Transporte Intermodal (en adelante, UTI) o contendores ISO Intermodales. Asirla, abrazarla e izarla de manera inadecuada (la UTI soporta tensio-nes mecánicas y dinámicas resultantes de todos los modos de transporte), y/o no tener cuidado al mover las mercancías dentro o fuera del equipo de maniobrabilidad aumenta el riesgo de daños.

- Las mercancías durante su desplazamiento en la UTIs son susceptibles a sufrir daños por impactos, caídas, vibraciones, sobrepresiones, compresiones, aceleraciones, desaceleraciones, aplastamientos, cizallamientos y desplazamientos (Figura 2) si la carga y la UTI no está correctamente estibada, apilada, trincada y asegurada.

Figura 2. Tensiones mecánicas y dinámicas resultantes en el transporte de contenedores ISO intermodales en barcazas. Fuente: Google ©℠™®

III. Contaminación

Un riesgo particular para los alimentos y productos farmacéuticos es la posibilidad de contaminarse mientras está en ruta desde el origen hasta el destino (O-D). El consignatario podrá rechazar una entrega de bienes si existe evidencia de una posible adulteración. El consignatario nunca querrá asumir el riesgo de pérdida de la mercancía. El riesgo de contaminación del producto aumenta proporcionalmente con la distancia del viaje y el tiempo de tránsito. Cuanto más tiempo estén las mercancías fuera de su control directo del consignatario (almacén), mayores oportunidades existirán para que surjan problemas de contaminación provocada por el hombre.

Los principales riesgos de contaminación de las mercancías incluyen:

- Falla en el control del microclima al interior del contenedor ISO intermodal. Mercancías sensibles al medio ambiente como frutas, hortalizas, flor de corte, mariscos, vacunas, productos electrónicos, muestras biomédicas y productos químicos a menudo requieren ser transportados dentro de un rango estricto de temperatura o humedad. No proporcionar un clima estable dentro de la UTI durante el tránsito resultará en la degradación del producto, deterioro o contaminación.

Figura 3. Inadecuado manejo del microclima al interior del contenedor ISO intermodal (izquierda, cadena de frío bajo control; derecha, rotura de la cadena de frío) generó el deterioro comercial del embarque. Fuente: Google ©℠™®

- Inadecuada maniobrabilidad de la mercancía. La contaminación deliberada de los productos después de haber sido fabricados es un riesgo remoto pero potencialmente devastador. Dada la amenaza de demandas y el daño de la imagen y marca de la organización, el solo indicio de maniobrabilidad puede requerir un esfuerzo costoso para retirar las mercancías de los estantes de las tiendas, reabastecer la cadena de suministro y reconstruir la confianza del consumidor.

- Exposición a contaminantes. El riesgo de que la carga entre en contacto consustancias indeseables (física, química o biológicamente) ocurre cuando diferentes tipos de la cargas se mezclan en un solo envío. De igual forma, surgen problemas de contaminación si la UTI se utiliza para mover diferentes productos en viajes consecutivos.

- Contaminación fitosanitaria. La Convención Internacional de Protección Fitosanitaria (CIPF) ha confirmado que los contenedores marítimos con carga propagan plagas y enfermedades (excrementos, heces, plumas y otros deshechos de aves, insectos y plantas, semillas, esporas, moho, hongos y huevos de una o más especies exóticas invasivas, etc. (Figura 4).

Este es el motivo por el cual los países del mundo se unieron hace más de seis decenios con el objetivo de ayudar a detener la propagación a través del comercio internacional trasfronterizo. Los flujos de contenedores son complejos y pueden involucrar múltiples cruces fronterizos, traspasos de control y modos de transporte por donde se propaga la contaminación. Hoy día, en torno al 93% del comercio mundial se transporta por mar, con una amplia variedad de alternativas logísticas, dificultando así un acuerdo sobre un método común de inspección.

Figura 4. Contenedores ISO intermodales contaminados fitosanitariamente. Fuente: recopilación del autor

IV. Retrasos

Nada más frustrante que la entrega tardía de un envío urgente. Empresas que confían en la entrega del embarque bajo la filosofía del Justo a Tiempo, y que mantienen sus líneas de producción en funcionamiento, puede experimentar la misma frustración, solo que a un nivel mayor y adicionalmente con costo financiero. Si un envío crítico se retrasa, incluso por unas pocas horas, existe la posibilidad de que las líneas de producción se detengan. El costo de la pérdida de la productividad puede ser de decenas de miles de dólares.

Existen numerosos riesgos que generan retrasos en las entregas. Algunos peligros inherentes a las operaciones logística de transporte son el resultado de decisiones estratégicas críticas como es el abastecimiento de productos de fabricantes-proveedores de bajo costo del lejano oriente. Esta estrategia aumenta significativamente la complejidad y la distancia de la cadena intermodal de transporte, ampliando la posi-bilidad de retraso en las entregas. Otros riesgos fuera del control del consignatario tienen impacto potencial en los tiempos de entrega, estos incluyen:

• Congestión vial. Camiones, trenes, instalaciones portuarias, UTIs, cajas móviles, semirremolques sobrecargados impiden flujo vial y crean cuellos de botella en la cadena intermodal de transporte. Mientras el equipo permanece inactivo en el tráfico (flujo de vehículos circulando por una carretera o vía urbana) y las velocidades promedio disminuyen, generando tiempos de tránsito más len-tos de lo estimado, el combustible se desperdicia, y colapsan los plazos de entrega. Los puertos marítimos también luchan con la congestión creada por los megaportacontenedores «megacarriers» en temporada alta y por el arribo tardío de los buques a los puertos.

• Eventos climáticos extremos. A medida que las condiciones meteorológicas deterioran, se vuelve más desafiante mantener un cronograma preciso de entregas. Empresas ubicadas en zonas climáticas peligrosas: huracanes, tifones, tormentas (Figura 5), precipitaciones, nubosidad, nieve, mar de leva, deslaves, desbordamiento, desastres naturales, etc., debe tener en cuenta estos proble-mas incontrolables en la planificación del movimiento de carga y, en efecto, con los compromisos de entrega.

El mega-portacontenedores ONE APUS, gestionado por las empresas ONE y NYK, se enfrentó el 30 de noviembre de 2020 a una fuerte tormenta en el Océano Pacífico, en la ruta China-Estados Unidos. Debido a los fuertes vientos y al oleaje, el buque terminó con su carga volcada; 1.816 conte-nedores cayeron al mar, de los cuales 64 transportaban mercancías peligrosas. Después de enfrentar la tormenta, el buque cambió de rumbo con destino a Japón. Además de los 1.816 contenedores que cayeron al mar, cientos más quedaron a bordo del buque con sus cargas parcial o totalmente dañadas. Este es considerado el segundo mayor accidente con portacontenedores, desde el hundimiento del MOL COMFORT en 2013, cuando el buque se partió por el medio. En ese episodio cayeron más de 4.300 contenedores al mar.

• Mal funcionamiento de los equipos. Las averías mecánicas de los vehículos de distribución pueden provocar que las mercancías queden varadas en el camino. Asimismo, los problemas con los equi-pos de maniobrabilidad de las mercancías en los puertos (grúas pórtico) y de otras instalaciones de transferencia de carga puede retrasar los envíos más allá de los tiempos de entrega programados.

Figura 5. Buque Portacontenedores bajo tormenta en Tauranga, Nueva Zelanda. 830 contenedores se pierden en el mar. Fuente; Google ©℠™®

V. Interrupciones

Toda una variedad de riesgos acompañan el transporte de mercancías, la mayoría de ellos por la mala ejecución e ineficacia de las operaciones logísticas diarias. La toma de decisiones inapropiadas o desacertadas (personal de cuello blanco), los errores de los empleados (personal de cuello azul) y los problemas técnicos ralentizan los flujos de carga. Los anteriores riesgos, no son nada en comparación con los efectos devastadores de las disputas fronterizas, cierre sanitario de fronteras y las huelgas portuarias que detienen, de manera monumental, las operaciones logísticas de transporte. El costo de tales interrupciones es alto y se prolonga de manera crítica con el tiempo de recuperación.

Aunque no ocurren con frecuencia, estos problemas a menudo quedan fuera del control del consignatario. Ejemplos recientes de disrupciones de la cadena de transporte intermodal incluyen:

• Cierre sanitario de fronteras. La pandemia de Covid-19 creó una enorme disrupción global, el paro abrupto de la demanda impactó la red mundial de suministro; las cadenas de suministro de consumo fueron perturbadas masivamente. Se estima que entre las 1.000 compañías incluidas en la lista Fortune 2020, el 94% de ellas fueron afectadas negativamente por el Covid-19. Debido a que las cadenas globales de suministro se hayan hiperconectadas, muchas empresas a nivel global se vieron afectadas por esta pandemia. Bloqueo prolongado, interrupción de vuelos en varios países, el cierre de fronteras aéreas, marítimas y terrestres, acompañado con el cierre de plantas industriales, contribuyeron a la interrupción total de cadenas de suministro en todo el mundo.

El Covid-19 supuestamente se originó de Wuhan en diciembre de 2019, Wuhan la capital de la provincia de Hubei en China es un centro logístico importante para un sinnúmero proveedores de cadenas de suministro a nivel mundial -China contribuye con alrededor del 19% del PIB mundial-. El efecto dominó de los cierres de las plantas y la escasez de suministros a través de la red mundial impactó de manera negativa la logística global.

• Bloqueo. El megaportacontenedores EVERGIVEN de 400 metros de largo y con 18.300 contenedores a bordo encalló (Figura 6) en diagonal en la sección sur del canal de Suez bloqueando una de las vías marítimas más transitadas del mundo. Las pérdidas diarias que se registran son de USD$ 10.000.000.000 por día, bloqueó el 10% del comercio global. Gracias a este paso se puede transportar de Europa a Asia y viceversa sin la necesidad de circunnavegar toda África, así que se ahorran días de viaje. Se estima que por ahí pasa el 10 % del comercio global. Motivo del encallamiento se fondearon más de 500 buques en el canal en espera que se reabra el paso en el mar Mediterráneo y el mar Rojo; es la principal ruta de petróleo entre Rusia, China e India.

El 90% de las mercancías que está contenedorizada abordo del EVERGIVEN no se encontraba asegurada, lo que generó una serie de demandas que no estaban contempladas en los contratos que se formulaban hoy en día. El bloqueo del canal de Suez preocupa porque el comercio global genera de manera inmediata variación de precios y de desabastecimiento de todo el mundo. Tomar la ruta larga (circunnavegar toda África) genera costos adicionales de alrededor de 15%.

• Falta de capacidad. En ocasiones, durante la demanda estacional máxima, la capacidad de transporte es estirada hasta el punto de que los transportistas, a menudo, no pueden proporcionar suficientes equipos y operadores para dar servicio a todos los clientes. Las empresas de transporte tienden a aumentar las tarifas del flete y/o aplicar recargos de temporada alta. Al mismo tiempo, existe el riesgo de fallas en la calidad del servicio debido a la congestión de las instalaciones, la es-casez de equipos y la falta de operadores expertos.

Figura 6. Mega-portacontenedores EVERGIVEN, de 400 metros de eslora y con 18.300 contenedores a bordo, encallado en el Canal de Suez. Fuente: © EVERGREEN; Google ©℠™®

VI. Inseguridad

Los ataques terroristas, la actividad del crimen organizado con actividades como el tráfico de armas, de narcóticos, de productos adulterados, de flora y fauna silvestre, de bienes culturales, los ataques cibernéticos, la migración humana involuntaria (Figura 7), etc., ha promovido que el comercio legal aúne esfuerzos globales con el objeto de brindar seguridad al transporte de mercancías.

Las organizaciones de transporte perfeccionan, de manera continua, sus políticas y medidas para proteger la carga en tránsito. Si no lo hacen, las empresas, sus clientes, y el público en general serán vulnerables a las amenazas y peligros que sobrelleva la inseguridad. Los repetidos fracasos en temas de seguridad en el transporte de mercancías impulsan a los gobiernos del mundo a demandar de inspecciones en la cadena de transporte intermodal que requieren de incontable tiempo y costosas contramedidas. Sutiles delincuentes conspiran de manera continua con el objeto de explotar las fallas de los sistemas de seguridad, y en efecto, la vulnerabilidad de este. Entre los puntos más comunes que ataca la delincuencia se tienen:

• Procesos de seguridad laxos. La seguridad y la resiliencia de la cadena de suministro no son opcionales; estas deben integrarse en las operaciones globales del transporte de mercancías. Las empresas deben identificar sus posibles vulnerabilidades de seguridad y desarrollar adecuadas estrate-gias de defensa.

• Instalaciones de transferencia no protegidas: algunas empresas de transporte no cumplen con simples requerimientos de seguridad como cerrar puertas, cercar las instalaciones, circuito cerrado de televisión para limitar y controlar el acceso a equipos de carga y transporte. Facilidad de entrada y acceso a las instalaciones promueve el robo de productos, la contaminación deliberada (esconder narcóticos en un contenedor de carga).

• Fallas de control en los envíos: la visibilidad de la carga y el control de acceso son las claves para proteger de daños las mercancías en tránsito. Cuando la carga no está debidamente controlada, aumentan los riesgos de seguridad y las oportunidades de interrupción. Por ejemplo, sin supervisión los contenedores de carga abiertos proporcionan escondites para los polizones que intentan entrar ilegalmente en un país. Los polizones pueden contaminar el contenido del contenedor y causar inconvenientes legales para las autoridades.

Figura 7. Migración humana involuntaria movilizada en contenedores ISO intermodales.
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Aunque se han identificado seis categorías de riesgo y discutido 20 riesgos específicos, la lista no es de ninguna manera exhaustiva. Los peligros de la cadena de transporte intermodal son muchos y variados. Peligros de materiales peligrosos, agua salada corrosiva, carga sudada (ocurrencia de condensación), problemas de cruce de fronteras, conflictos militares y otros problemas amenazan constantemente con interrumpir las operaciones de transporte intermodal de mercancías. Los logistas (profesionales dedicados a la disciplina de la logística) deben permanecer atentos a las posibles amenazas y analizar de manera constan-te los riesgos inherentes a las actividades logísticas del transporte de mercancías.

La gestión de riesgos es parte integral de la gestión eficaz del transporte de mercancías. Es un proceso interactivo que permite la mejora continua del rendimiento al interior de la organización. La gestión de riesgos es el proceso de identificación del riesgo, sus causas y efectos, esto, con el objetivo de aumentar una mayor comprensión común del riesgo, así, gestionar, reducir, transferir o eliminar amenazas en la cadena intermodal de mercancías. Es importante alinear estos objetivos de gestión de riesgos con las estrategias y metas de la organización. Estas estrategias y los resultados deseados proporcionan el contexto para la administración del riesgo.

El primer paso para desarrollar un programa de gestión eficaz de riesgos del transporte intermodal de mercancías es descubrir, definir, describir, documentar y comunicar los riesgos antes de que se conviertan en problemas y afecten negativamente los flujos de mercancías. El objetivo de identificar los riesgos es reconocer, como sea posible, la mayor cantidad de riesgos de interrupción del transporte. Evaluar los riesgos del transporte es el segundo en el desarrollo del programa de gestión eficaz de riesgos de transporte intermodal de mercancías; es una propuesta desafiante porque no afectan a las organizaciones de manera igual. Los riesgos y su impacto potencial están influenciados por la estrategia de la cadena intermodal de transporte, los modos utilizados y sus capacidades operativas. El objetivo de la evaluación de riesgos es evaluar la gravedad de cada riesgo identificado. Utilizando el resultado de la evaluación de riesgos, el si-guiente paso es crear una estrategia coherente para gestionar y mitigar, de forma rentable, los riesgos del transporte intermodal de mercancías. La estrategia de mitigación identifica esfuerzos, acciones y cambios de procedimiento específicos que deben ser tomados en cuenta por la gestión con el propósito de reducir los riesgos de alta prioridad. El objetivo es reducir la probabilidad de que ocurra un riesgo y/o minimizar el impacto negativo si se produce el riesgo.

Un riesgo nunca puede ser eliminado totalmente, pero su frecuencia y efectos pueden reducirse si se abordan de manera adecuada. Las estrategias y acciones de mitigación del riesgo no deben aplicarse al azar, deben estar sincronizadas con la estrategia general de la cadena de transporte intermodal de mercancías, con la estrategia corporativa, centrarse en cuestiones de alta prioridad y ser razonables en térmi-nos de costo y tiempo de implementación frente a la probabilidad de éxito. De lo contrario, se desperdiciará dinero y esfuerzo en riesgos de baja prioridad o soluciones de riesgo ineficaces.

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COVID AND THE ONE BELT ONE ROAD: CHINESE INTERNATIONAL STATUS AND GLOBAL ECONOMIC GROWTH

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1. Introduction

In 2019, COVID appeared as a challenge for the world, for which no government seemed to be prepared, except for those who had experience handling infectious-type emergencies such as SARS in previous years. On the other hand, China has started the most ambitious global investment project of the 21st century, an alternative that raises inclusive globalization. This means, China has maintained a position as a country with an average per capita income, which makes it a worthy participant in the developing world, of which it has managed to overcome certain traps that today allow it to be the second-largest economy of the world, with a 40-year history of sustained economic growth at high rates, but with the firm idea of generating progress and development in those countries where it is determined to locate its investment in search of better terms of exchange and integration with the international markets.

Although the BRI is the most ambitious project for the XXI century's economic development, the number of members and projects are growing uninterruptedly in the last venues of the OBOR initiative. Chinese international status could be affected internationally by the perceptions created from political and economic sectors that question the country's transparency in the origin of COVID-19 and the criticisms created against the socialist regime's response. However, economic recovery options should be focused on infrastructure, as this sector is one that has the most significant impact on economic recovery and growth. This issue is in line with the inclusive globalization that OBOR proposes to its partners.

A China committed to building infrastructure that facilitates trade and the integration of regional markets. The facilitation of intermediation and transport during the trade of goods and services is a fundamental priority that allows countries to improve their globalization position. The improvement of infrastructure for development has a significant impact on people's quality of life and being a global proposal, without being restricted to international subjects. Recently with COVID, all the enthusiasm could become even more a necessity than a willingness for cooperation. The need becomes an opportunity for negotiation and agreements, based on the win-win principle, reactivation of economies, the inclusion of labor markets, and envision the positive externalities that these projects can generate in the future for social prosperity.

2. OBOR: Inclusive globalization and chinese global leadership

On September 7, 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping gave a speech at Nazarbayev University in Kazakhstan. In this speech, he stated that "[...] to forge close economic ties, deepen cooperation and expand the development space in the Eurasian region, we should take an innovative approach and jointly build an economic belt through the Silk Road." In his speech, he remarked that the more than 2,000 years of history and contact have shown that nations with different racial, religious and cultural origins can well share peace and common development, as long as they adhere to principles, such as unity, equality, cooperation, adaptation, mutual trust, and mutual benefit. Following the same style of discursive construction in front of the Indonesian parliament during the same tour of Central Asia and Southeast Asia in 2013, Xi presented the second pillar of his plan: he proposed to build jointly with the nations of the ASEAN the Maritime Route of the Silk of the XXI century.

The One Belt One Road (OBOR) was fully incorporated into the Chinese National Strategy for Economic Development; this decision was welcomed within the Central Conference of Economic Work held in 2014. This conference is an annual event attended by President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Keqiang, and Vice Premier Liu He as the most relevant figures. They were also accompanied by financial regulation officials, economic planners, governors, leaders of the National People's Congress, the Supreme Court, the People's Supreme Prosecutor's Office, state companies, financial institutions, and the People's Liberation Army. In theory, 204 members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and 172 alternative members were to attend along with a list of invited delegates (South China Morning Post", 2018).

Figure 1:Map 1. Iniciativa del Cinturón y la Ruta de la Seda. Fuente: "Does China Have What It Takes to Be a Superpower?" (2018).

Consequently, Beijing announced three regional development plans, and OBOR was one of these. This project helped China to connect its western territories with the closest economic centers, which integrated the markets of neighboring countries, so that, through trade, it is possible to improve the level of income received by the populations of the area and increase employment through infrastructure projects and increased commercial exchanges, in an economy that oriented its development on exports. For this reason, the government agency that coordinates the initiative is the National Development and Reform Commission, along with technical support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce.

National projects related to the Silk Road will be the Chinese government's priority, considering that it can make effective necessary adjustments because these projects are subject to its standards and legal order. On the contrary, the projects handled abroad have more risk from external institutional factors from the host country. The Silk Road contains a robust discursive construction, which, for Weidong Liu and Michael Dunford (2016), turns out to be a metaphor in itself. Both the institutions and academic circles defend and build both the spirit and the principles of a new era for international cooperation, a project that represents a turning point from the development model supported by the Washington consensus. BRI is the tool through which a new cooperative and economic language arises for development and welfare. The principles and foundations will frame the economy's path with the second highest GDP to build its manifest destiny based on inclusive globalization.

In 2007, the World Bank president, Robert B. Zoellick, referred to "inclusive globalization" for the first time. In this way, he stated that this "[i] s the vision of the World Bank Group to contribute to an inclusive and sustainable globalization: to overcome poverty, improve growth while caring for the environment, and create individual opportunities and hopes."

This expression's spirit served to formulate the discourse necessary to structure "the Belt and the Silk Road." This concept is an immanent critique of the last thirty or forty years; inclusive globalization incorporates fundamental similarities and differences with the former. Inclusive globalization does not imply de-globalization or reversing globalization, but rather a fundamental development and reform of globalization.
In this way, inclusive and neoliberal globalization go in the same direction. The fundamental difference between the two is that inclusive globalization is designed first and foremost to improve people's livelihoods, rather than solely serving capital interests. Second, capital markets require reform to direct investment to infrastructure and productive activities. Third, unlike a neoliberal path imposed from above, countries should choose development paths that suit their own national conditions. Fourth, participation must be open to all and generate mutual benefits. Finally, cultural diversity (and the environment) must be protected.

Since the 1980s, with the growing prevalence of neoliberal ideologies advocating the liberalization of trade, investment, and the state's withdrawal from national economic management activities (Washington Consensus measures). The neoliberal reform agenda redistributed the public's roles and power to private actors, reduced the capacity of modern territorial states, and returned residual state functions to subordinate administrations. However, the countries that followed the Washington Consensus national measures (Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the formerly communist Eastern Europe) did not perform well. China, conversely, took advantage of the relocation of industries to promote rapid economic growth. While rapid growth in China saw an increase in inequality (which is to be expected as an initially industrialized and urbanized country), growth lifted everyone, in the sense that the incomes of most sectors of society increased but at different speed rates.

China's recovery also played an important role in reducing poverty (inclusive growth) in stark contrast to much of the rest of the world, where neoliberal globalization saw poverty rise. In 1981-2005, an inclusive development model lifted 627.4 million Chinese out of poverty, earning a daily income of USD 1.25. In the world, excluding China, the number of poor increased by 107.9 million (Ravallion, 2010). The reason for these differences was that "the virtues of the invisible hand of the market" were balanced with "the virtues of good governance" (Mahbubani, 2008).

China's economic success resulted from the Chinese Government's ability to adopt a useful export-oriented growth model. This strategy involved several elements. First, the new China developed a strong sense of national identity and a healthy state capable of delivering collective goods (health, education, law and order, infrastructure, and industrial policy). Second, China could exercise control over its capital account, allowing the Central Bank to accumulate reserves and the Government to create a sovereign wealth fund. The accumulation of reserves put downward pressure on China's exchange rate, strengthening export competitiveness, profitability, investment, and limiting consumption and imports. However, negative reserves got invested in safe government securities in the short term with low-interest rates. Third, China mobilized domestic savings and foreign direct investment and transformed it into investments in agriculture, infrastructure, and capital-intensive domestic industrial capacity, equipment, and consumer goods.

The accumulation of reserves also meant that China was generating more savings than spending on domestic investment by providing credit to developed countries that imported their exports. Fourth, China developed an industrial policy in which effective protection was combined with export promotion, and import substitution was encouraged. However, the orientation of exports disciplined and encouraged domestic industries to be competitive in the international context. Therefore, the lesson from this experience is that the ability to harness globalization depends on the capacity of the state that actually declined in countries that adopted national neoliberal reform agendas.

In this sense, it is important to note that China's guidelines to achieve world leadership depart from any discursive construction of previous great powers because, for the East Asian country, the development path has as a key element the different developing nations, which will also help overcome Chinese national challenges that have global repercussions, such as excess capacity. This can be seen in the following paragraph, which demonstrates the discursive construction, the foundations, and principles of this ambitious project that will mark the future of the People's Republic and its status in the world:

"In the XXI century, a new era marked by the theme of peace, development, cooperation and mutual benefit, is the most important for all participants and that allow to carry and extend the spirit of the Silk Road to face the weak recovery of the global economy and complex international and regional situations" (National Development and Reform Commission of the People's Republic, 2015)

In a very consistent way with the search for peace, China reduces the gaps and conflicts between East and West. For this reason, it proposes, through these principles, to avoid any economic, political, and military confrontation with any of its competitors. Thus, China proposes the following to make plausible the peaceful resolution of controversies of a global nature that seem irreconcilable:

"For thousands of years, the spirit of the Silk Road, "peace and cooperation, openness and inclusion, mutual learning and mutual benefit", has passed from generation to generation, promoting the progress of human civilization and contributing enormously to prosperity. Moreover, the development of the countries that comprise it. It symbolizes communication and cooperation between East and West; its spirit is a historic and cultural heritage shared with all the world's countries." (Xinhua, 2017).

BRI is an initiative that, according to the speeches made by Xi Jinping, is open to all regions of the world and seeks to promote intergovernmental cooperation, build intergovernmental macro and multi-level policy exchanges, along with communication mechanisms to expand shared interests, strengthen mutual political trust and reach new cooperation consensuses (Commission for National Development and Reform of the People's Republic, 2015). However, the documents issued prioritize the connections between China and the countries along the ancient Silk Road and propose to build six land transport corridors: a new Eurasian land bridge and China-Mongolia-Russia, China-Central Asia. Western Asia, China-Pakistan, Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar, and the economic corridors between China-Indochina will deepen the great historical evolution of relations with ASEAN in recent decades.

3. Covid 19 an overview

3.1. origin, numbers and trends

The COVID-19 is a disease caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2). It was first identified in December 2019 in Wuhan, China. The World Health Organization declared the outbreak a Public Health Emergency of International Concern in January 2020 and a pandemic in March 2020. As shown in figure1, the number of cases was increasing exponentially in the Hubei region in China. It can be seen how the measures and policies applied by the Chinese Government concerning the number of deaths and cases traced.

According to information provided by the World Health Organization, on January 10, 2021, the world accumulated 89,048,345 people infected by the COVID-19 virus, and 1,930,265 deaths related to the disease's symptoms were reported.

This high contagion capacity of the virus leads to a race against time to find an effective vaccine against the virus strains. In this way, around 57 vaccines were in clinical research, while another 40 vaccines were distributed between phases I and II of this type of health development process. This imposes a challenge for the international system, taking into account the poor distribution of wealth that exists since the establishment of the principles of the Washington consensus, leads us to imagine that access to the vaccine will be defined by the capacity of each government to provide the necessary doses to their fellow citizens. Simultaneously, in the developing world where the headquarters of pharmaceutical laboratories are not found, there is the dilemma of access guarantees and the international financial system's ability to leverage this investment in Public Health, which becomes vital because of a possible economic reactivation.



Figure 2: Hubei Timeline. Source: https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/hubei-timeline



Figure 3: Map 2: WHO Coronavirus disease Dashboard. 12/01/2020

3.2. world economy under COVID-19

The magnitude and speed of the economic collapse were unprecedented (Figure 2). The crisis undermined global financial stability, and large segments of the global economy ground to a standstill, including the informal economy, which remains large in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa. To save lives, governments financed additional health and emergency services. Where conditions and room in the budget allowed, governments also stopped the freefall of global growth with extraordinary monetary and fiscal support—the latter to the tune of $11.5 trillion globally as of September 2020— to extend lifelines to businesses and people. These exceptional times required equally exceptional, quick action. The IMF has worked to help protect people, help protect the economy, and help countries prepare for the recovery. (IMF, 2020)

Every region is subject to substantial growth downgrades. East Asia and the Pacific will grow by a scant 0.5%. South Asia will contract by 2.7%, Sub-Saharan Africa by 2.8%, Middle East and North Africa by 4.2%, Europe and Central Asia by 4.7%, and Latin America by 7.2%. These downturns are expected to reverse years of progress toward development goals and tip tens of millions of people back into extreme poverty. (World Bank, 2021)

Economic headwinds will buffet emerging market and developing economies from multiple quarters: pressure on weak health care systems, loss of trade and tourism, dwindling remittances, subdued capital flows, and tight financial conditions amid mounting debt. Exporters of energy or industrial commodities will be particularly hard hit. The pandemic and efforts to contain it have triggered an unprecedented collapse in oil demand and a crash in oil prices. Demand for metals and transport-related commodities such as rubber and platinum used for vehicle parts has also tumbled. While agriculture markets are well supplied globally, trade restrictions and supply chain disruptions could raise food security issues in some places.

Efforts to contain COVID-19 in emerging and developing economies, including low-income economies with limited health care capacity, could precipitate deeper and longer recessions—exacerbating a multi-decade trend of slowing potential growth and productivity growth. Many emerging and developing economies were already experiencing weaker growth before this crisis; the shock of COVID-19 now makes the challenges these economies face even harder. (IMF, 2020)



Figure 4: Annual gdp growth (1980-2025) source imf
https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/ngdp_rpch@weo/oemdc/advec/weoworld



Figure 5: World GDP projections. Source OECD. https://www.oecd.org/economic-outlook/

Figure 6: Contribution to the Global Government Debt (2007-2020). Source IMF Annual report 2020

4. Chinise international status littered by the covid response

4.1. China and the Search for International Status

Since the victory of Mao Zedong, China has sought to increase its international status, taking into account that the elites of the Communist Party understand this as obtaining conventional military and economic power and the success of its foreign policy. In this sense, it has been aimed at the construction of a nationalist feeling, which elevates its internal status towards the outside, which, through education from the first levels, instills in the population the knowledge of their culture, the 5,000 years of history as a civilization, its important contributions to humanity, pride and commitment to its tradition. This is how the Party plans to restore the past glory that the empire had during the Silk Road years. (Vejarano, 2019)

Importantly, Chinese foreign policy is fundamentally dependent on domestic policy and specifically responds to domestic interests. This rhetoric has been used by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from the very moment that its revolutionary cause began. Through time, it has maintained political legitimacy within its population, considering itself as the instrument that will restore China's lost status in the world.

China has shifted quickly from a low-income to an upper-middle-income country, as defined by the World Bank. The proportion of the population living in extreme poverty (on less than US$ 1.90 per day, 2011 dollars at PPP) fell from 66 percent in 1990 to 0.7 percent in 2015, while the proportion below the World Bank's upper-middle-income country poverty line of less than 1US$ 5.50 per day fell from 98 percent to 27 percent. China is, therefore, sometimes portrayed as a model for other authoritarian or developing countries. Since the 1980s, and much more actively since the early 2000s, the Chinese government has thus sought to address this challenge through a wide range of reforms in all fields of social policy. (Sander, Schmitt, & Kuhnle, 2012)

In recent years, China's international responsibilities have increased dramatically. This is due to participation in various international scenarios; one of them is relative to peacekeeping operations. China is now the country that contributes the most to international peacekeeping operations.

From 2013 to 2018, China provided foreign assistance worth 270.2 billion yuan through grants, interest-free loans, and concessional loans. Among the assistance, grants amounts for 127.8 billion yuan, taking 47.3 percent of the total and mainly went to helping other developing countries build small and medium-sized social welfare projects and to fund projects for cooperation in human resources development, technical cooperation, material assistance, and emergency humanitarian assistance, as well as projects under the South-South Cooperation Assistance Fund (CGTN, 2021)

4.2. COVID-19: Chinese stroke international status.

Due to the response and place of origin of the virus, the hard work of creating an image of responsible, trustworthy and transparent power has faded into the landscape of COVID-19 and the countless victims that have yet to cease. It is important to mention that China's efforts to increase international cooperation and humanitarian aid to alleviate the negative effects of the pandemic on the world's vulnerable populations have not been enough, the world population generalized the guilt of China as the initiator and responsible for the global crisis that affects us even an effective distribution and access to vaccines promised by the big international pharmaceutical companies in the media, which apparently are the only beneficiaries during the deep global economic crisis generated by generalized quarantines.

After initial cases of the coronavirus started appearing in China's Hubei Province in late 2019, many around the world questioned the expediency of China's response to the outbreak, and others critiqued some of the measures Beijing used to contain the virus within its borders. But in Wuhan, the original epicenter of the outbreak, the strict lockdown has ended and the new case count plummeted to at or near zero by May. (Pew Research Center, 2020)

According to the same report from the Pew Research Center, among the 14 advanced economies surveyed, most rate China's COVID-19 response negatively. A median of 61% says China has done a bad job dealing with the coronavirus outbreak, while 37% believe the country has done a good job. The rise in unfavorable views comes amid widespread criticism over how China has handled the coronavirus pandemic. Across the 14 nations surveyed, a median of 61% says China has done a bad job dealing with the outbreak. This is many more than say the same way the COVID-19 pandemic was handled by their own country or by international organizations like the World Health Organization or the European Union. Only the U.S. receives more negative evaluations from the surveyed public, with a median of 84% saying the U.S. has poorly handled the coronavirus outbreak.

Even with these poor perceptions, in the studio there is a valuable window of opportunity for China's future in the world. When it comes to perceptions of economic strength, China fares relatively well in the survey. Of four options given, people in most countries polled are most likely to see China as the world's top economy. This is particularly true in Europe, where a plurality or majority in every country surveyed says China is the world's leading economic power. Outside of the U.S. itself – where 52% of Americans say the U.S. is the world's leading economic power – only in Japan (53%) and South Korea (77%) do more name the U.S. than China. (Pew Research Center, 2020)

4. OBOR y Economic Recovery/Resilience

There is still much uncertainty worldwide about the future of our economies and the faces that the virus will show us as time passes, 9 months, a year, more time? These are questions that continue to be repeated in each of the societies of this troubled world. However, assuming that there will be an improvement in the conditions for the virus, following the OECD calculations raised earlier in the economic analysis of the factors resulting from COVID-19.

In this way, it is important to recognize the positive externalities produced by the construction of public infrastructure to reactivate the economy, this is defended by several authors, among them Mamatzakis' (2008) calculations suggest that the infrastructure is an important component of economic activity in Greece. His estimates show that the public infrastructure reduces costs in the most manufacturing industries, as it strengthens the growth of productivity of resources. The efficient infrastructure supports economic growth, improves quality of life, and it is important for national security (Baldwin, Dixon, 2008). The researchers analyze the impact of infrastructure in various aspects: regional competitiveness, economic growth, income inequality, output, labor productivity, the impact on the environment and well-being (in time and cost savings, increased safety, the development of information networks) (Bristow and Nellthorp (2000)). Some authors argue that investment in infrastructure can stimulate organizational and management changes: the construction of the railway system will lead to the standardization of the schedule, which leads to increased revenue in addition to having railway service (Mattoon, 2004). Public infrastructure provides the geographic concentration of economic resources and wider and deeper markets for output and employment (Gu, Macdonald, 2009). (Palei, 2014)

According to the aforementioned, the Information Office of the State Council of China published the white paper entitled "China's International Development Cooperation in the New Era." China entered a new era after the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 2012. Since then, the country has considered China's responsibilities from a global perspective and proposed its vision of a global community of a shared future and the Belt and Road Initiative. (CGTN, 2021)

The paper specifically illustrates that "international development cooperation" refers to China's bilateral and multilateral efforts, within the framework of South-South cooperation, to promote economic and social development through foreign aid, humanitarian assistance, and other means. It is important to remember the different International Financial Organizations (FIGURES 2,4), which take for granted that the regions most affected by the crisis will be Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, where they also recognize that there will be a setback in the fight against poverty. In this way, China, through the BRI (OBOR), is so far the only current possibility that allows strengthening and boosting the economies that today are deeply affected by this pandemic.

The white paper identified Belt and Road cooperation as a major platform to promote policy, infrastructure, trade, financial and people-to-people connectivity among countries. It also identified helping other developing countries pursue the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development as a key goal, narrowing the North-South gap and helping build a common prosperous world.

The Chinese government is well aware that although China's economy is on pace to be the world's largest by the end of the decade, there is still much work to be done in developing the country's productive forces and creating common prosperity for the Chinese people. Thus, China sees other Global South countries as peers and will cooperate with them on this basis.

As the paper states, this is a different cooperation character than North-South cooperation, which is essentially a relationship of exploiter-exploited. According to the paper, China wants to avoid this image but is steadfast in breaking down this power dynamic altogether by leading the developing world to independence through development. For example, the paper says that providing the means for independent development to the Global South will be a top priority.

5. Conclusions

COVID – 19 profoundly impacts the world's population, politics, economics, health, social security, welfare, and many other factors surrounding the most significant world crisis in recent times. Since the Tiananmen Square incident, the Chinese Government has put much effort into improving its image to the world. However, its miraculous economic growth, taking so many individuals out of poverty, is a fact that needs to be applauded.

On the contrary, the Chinese image globally has been negatively impacted. The origin of the virus in Wuhan's markets in the Hubei region made the public believe that this East Asian country was not transparent and that China is the only one responsible for the circumstances that we are experiencing globally. According to this, the Chinese Government will need to reinvent the strategic communicational approach with foreign governments. Soft power is the key in this dense situation where everybody has signaled the Chinese.

This crisis offers opportunities for the Chinese Government:

1) The international status that has been worked carefully during the last 30 years is damaged for the global public opinions perspectives about the COVID-19 outbreak. Even if the Government is putting a great effort to avoid the word China o Chinese to be related to the flu, the trend shows that this racist rhetoric has applied to mainstream populist leaders in the Western Hemisphere. Accordingly, it provides an opportunity like no other to reinvent, reconstruct, improve, and reform the approach used for soft power and public diplomacy.

2) OBOR is the only option that the international economic system has for reactivation. Resilience is the key to Global Economic Recovery after the COVID outbreak. However, China's only path for secure, manageable, and responsible development has been offered to the world. The crisis poses several challenges for Governments, Private Enterprises, and the Social Sector worldwide. However, the only initiative or plan looking for the development and inclusion of populations to the globalization is OBOR

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COLOMBIA AND CHINA: FROM WELFARE CONCEPTIONS TO FORCED NEOLIBERALIZATION OF SOCIAL WELFARE

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2021

THESIS STATEMENT

China and Colombia would have different approaches to social welfare according to the western and East Asian constructions. In fact, these countries built social protection systems with high state intervention in the provision that entered in crisis with the global economic changes and the new path for development that forced this countries to implement economic liberalization processes of their domestic economies. Therefore, reforms were implemented according to market economy principles in each social protection system to palliate the critical conditions created by the structural reform transition.

WORK PLAN

A. China and Colombia would have different approaches to social welfare according to the western and East Asian constructions. In other view, global economic changes and the new path for development forced this countries to implement economic liberalization processes of their domestic economies.

1. China and Colombia would have different approaches to social welfare according to the western and East Asian constructions.

2. Global economic changes and economic liberalization processes

B. Reforms were implemented according to market economy principles in each social protection system to palliate the critical conditions created by the structural reform transition.

3. Global economic changes, social and systemic integration conflicts

4. China

5. Colombia

COLOMBIA AND CHINA: FROM WELFARE CONCEPTIONS TO FORCED NEOLIBERALIZATION OF SOCIAL WELFARE

China and Colombia would have different approaches to social welfare according to the western and East Asian constructions. In fact, these countries built social protection systems with high state intervention in the provision that entered in crisis with the global economic changes and the new path for development that forced this countries to implement economic liberalization processes of their domestic economies. Therefore, reforms were implemented according to market economy principles in each social protection system to palliate the critical conditions created by the structural reform transition.

According to the above mentioned, this essay is going to be conducted in three different parts: First, China and Colombia would have different approaches to social welfare according to the western and East Asian constructions. Secondly, how global economic changes and economic liberalization processes led to crisis in the systemic and social integration of the selected countries. Thirdly, Market economy, social chaos, and protection system reforms for development. Finally, a conclusion is going to be provided regarding the analysis of the arguments provided in this project.

1. China and Colombia would have different approaches to social welfare according to the western and East Asian constructions.

Social security is deeply rooted in several different thought traditions, which have impacted social policy preferences and practices. In this way, we could establish that beyond participating institutions, communities build social welfare in a community manner can build social welfare in a community manner according to the values, traditions, and culture rooted in the place.

For the International Labor Organization, social security is seen as a protection against economic and social deprivation through the application of public policies; If not, they would cause a sharp reduction in income due to illness, maternity, work accident or occupational disease, unemployment, disability, old age, and death, as well as protection in the form of medical assistance and aid to families with children (ILO, 2009).

According to other analysts, social security refers to the protection for the worker from the risks to which he is exposed and has the purpose of guaranteeing the right to health, medical assistance, the protection of the means of subsistence, and the services necessary for individual and collective well-being, as well as the right to receive a pension (Ruiz, 2004). However, reducing social security only to workers would be a mistake due to redistribution's positive externalities through service provision for unemployed population. We can establish that this type of vision recognizes countries such as Colombia but would ignore the concept of well-being built from Confucianism.

Social security comes from the following traditions:

1. "The tradition of the European Poor Laws of 1597, 1601 and 1834 is based on workhouses elements and is the ideological origin of modern resource testing practices (as opposed to unconditional benefits).

2. The master-servant tradition holds that when a person who, under his own responsibility for his own benefit, sets up agencies that create risk for others, must be civilly liable for the consequences of what he does (Herbert Asquith, 1906, cited in Dixon, 1999.

3. The tradition of occupational provident funds, if retained as the sole instrument, does not meet the social security requirements of modern society but continues to attract policymakers' interest, especially as an option for an additional layer of income security.

4. The (social) insurance tradition, while based on principles of mutual aid and actuarial equity, was the dominant social security success story in the 19th and 20th centuries, mainly in developed countries.

5. The Marxist-Leninist tradition, by its formal design, fought for a welfare state scenario that seems to have had a lot of overlap with a hybrid Bismarck-Beveridge concept. However, on the contrary, it replaced the individual employment policy with that of collective law and the macro-fiscal employment policy with the discipline of work, intending to enforce that daily social practice became directly equivalent to economic growth. 6. The tradition of the welfare state, although it is based on the macroeconomic and macro-fiscal policy of a government-oriented to full employment, seeks to humanize capitalism through the search for social stability and social progress while aiming at eliminating the social sources of our distress (Sigmund Freud, cited in Dixon, 1999). 7. The tradition of commodification, by contrast, emphasizes and focuses on the virtues of the market. This tradition believes in the Pareto principle and that individuals are the best judges of their own well-being; holds that individuals are rational, willing, calculating, and selfish, with ordered sets of individually known preferences."

6. The general tradition of minimum income is a radical culmination of neoliberal thinking. It grants the state the guarantee of a minimum social income to its citizens while leaving additional income security to the private sector. In most planes, the general tradition of minimum income aims at two objectives: (i) to eliminate the need for the production of primary income from individuals so that they are free from the limitations of material need in their daily decisions. While they are allowed to freely and voluntarily choose to work (or not); and/or (ii) reduce administrative complexities by replacing social security institutions and their inevitable interactions with minimal administrative units that register births and deaths." (Gongcheng & Scholz, 2019)

These traditions implicitly or explicitly reflect the specific predominant economic paradigmatic thinking, generally complemented by certain political ethics, where risk sharing plays a more or less prominent role. (Gongcheng & Scholz, 2019)

On the one hand, while scholars agree that China does not fit into any of the classic welfare state typologies, developments in China have still been constantly monitored along development lines. In the European welfare states. So far, few attempts have been made to identify the Chinese conception of well-being and the values and ideas that underlie this concept. (Sander, Schmitt, & Kuhnle, 2012)

Academic research on welfare states and their emergence and development has been strongly informed by three main approaches: socioeconomic functionalism, conflict theory, and institutionalist approaches. However, none of these classical theories can be easily applied to the development of social policies in China due, for example, to the lack of democratic institutions and an organized trade union movement.

This can be reinforced by the strong Western bias in social policy research that resulted in a neglect of Asia Pacific perspectives and an exclusion of East Asia from the Western concept of a welfare state, widely criticized by different scholars. (Jones, 1993; Jones and Finer, 2001; 2003; Walker and Wong, 1996)cited in (Sander, Schmitt, & Kuhnle, 2012). Theoretical approaches need to be reformulated from the models offered by the West, the regimes of East Asia should be included (Walker and Wong, 2005), per the different current of thought rooted in a society, for which the Confucianism is a traditional influencing factor in the way social policies are implemented.

However, even these claims of a "Confucian model" remain vague, given a substantial lack of analysis on its underlying cultural context and social norms. This is also largely true for the Western logic of the emergence and maturation of the welfare state (Titmuss, 1973; Taylor-Gooby, 1980; Chow, 1996). In the late 1990s and most prominently since the early 2000s, Confucian values have been re-employed and dominated the debate on well-being in China. Despite the original attempt to break out of Confucianism under Mao, Chinese leaders have consistently done so. (Sander, Schmitt, & Kuhnle, 2012)

The differences between the Western welfare systems and the Chinese welfare system can be traced from the conception of collectivism created during the Maoism period and a strong dependence on family ties. This value-based on traditional Confucianism had become particularly vivid during the early reform years when family ties were increasingly advertised as a means of providing well-being that the state was unable to provide. This logic persists until today, especially in rural areas, due to the absence of other social protection schemes and in the field of care for the elderly.

The concept of well-being raised by Confucianism follows the parameters of providing support concerning closeness, with strong networks of clans or communities that serve as basic units to ensure society's stability. Social norms and rules were established under kinship, maintaining the fundamental trait of the Confucian tradition of strong family ties, benevolent paternalism, social harmony, discipline, and a strong work ethic. The belief that inequality between people is normal and that those who work hard to maintain a harmonious society should be rewarded accordingly led to the exclusion of the poor and, in turn, often a reluctance to seek the State's support. The government is considered a benevolent and moral authority that grants social stability.

In comparison, Colombia follows the logic of the emergence and development of the welfare state in terms of the West, which reacts to industrialization and democratization. Based on the (universal) Christian belief in love and kindness as a precondition for earning a place in heaven, churches and charities gave aid to the poor. The notion of civil rights followed by political rights that ultimately lead to social rights dominates Western approaches. (Sander, Schmitt, & Kuhnle, 2012)Despite the differences in the emergence and development of the welfare state, Colombia is characterized by having strong family ties and values reaffirmed and shared with society. In this sense, it could be stated that, like China, Colombia has a social assistance subnet based on closeness and dependence on family ties.

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2. Global economic changes and economic liberalization processes led to crisis in the systemic and social integration.

Neoliberalism is generally associated with free-market capitalism because it contains the characteristics of increasing the role of markets (reducing capital controls, deregulating credit and labor markets), privatizing public companies, signing free trade agreements, reduce taxes and reduce public spending, as promoted in the 1980s and 1990s by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Evans .3 and Sewell, 2013; Ostry et al., 2016). (Depetris & Ramos, 2012)

These international institutions' structural adjustment policies were implemented in developing regions, such as Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa. As elsewhere, the IFIs operated under the conditions described in the "Washington Consensus" that called for stabilization measures that called for massive cuts in public spending, new and broader taxes, and high positive interest.

However, this package of recommendations did not start from a free choice but was imposed in the 1980s due to external debt problems in most developing countries. It does not exclude the responsibility of governments in the blind acceptance and without questioning the IMF formulas, without doing an actuarial analysis on the possible consequences on social security (Colmenares, 2007)

The structural adjustment policies administered by the IFIs also called for immediate trade liberalization combined with large currency devaluations, a massive reduction of tariffs, and the removal of non-tariff barriers. The privatization of state-owned companies and the deregulation of financial systems and prices also figured prominently in every SAP package signed with national governments. (El-Said & Harrigan, 2014)

According to the above, the new model requires greater participation of the private sector and a dependence on the private sector as the engine of investment (unlike state-owned companies). In addition to this alliance, there is a change in the role of the State: from autocratic management of the economy to coordinator of different institutional arrangements, director of investment, coordinator of projects promoting innovation and development of new products (as opposed to creating incentives to importing technology through foreign investment), sponsorship of productive rather than speculative foreign investment, and increased attention to the provision of social services to those outside the market.

In the developing world, the adoption of recommendations made by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank on the deregulation of the market, in order to create more jobs, there is no correspondence only to conjuncture fiscal consolidation measures; on the contrary, they obey a project that modifies the concept and the State-economy relationship as well as the State-citizen relationship in a structural way and with a single objective, to restore macroeconomic balances. (Colmenares, 2007)

It can be established that China went through reform and liberalization to create wealth and take advantage of globalization, maintaining the socialist principles of its political, economic, and social system. The phrase 'getting rich is glorious, which has been widely attributed to China's former top leader Deng Xiaoping, the architect of its free-market reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, still resonates with today's society that celebrates wealth. Personal (Duckett, 2020) Deng's open door and free-market policy with socialist characteristics led China to join the World Bank and the IMF, which led to the adoption of many highly promoted and theoretically sound measures. As China moved away from a Soviet-style state-planned economy, it introduced markets for goods and services, work and housing, sought reform of state-owned enterprises, privatized many public enterprises, and encouraged private enterprises. , lowered capital controls, and signed more than a dozen free trade agreements. (Duckett, 2020)

On February 20, 1990, Colombia's economic opening began, in the middle of the government of César Gaviria Trujillo. During the nineties of the twentieth century, it followed the same steps as China. It began to transfer productive activities, which have been perceived within the framework of political power, a market economy detached and differentiated from the state apparatus.

The State took care of the general conditions for capitalist production: the infrastructure and the legal framework necessary for profitable traffic of goods, but gradually expanded and granted new functions to the private sector. On the other hand, through the economic reforms carried out at the beginning of the 1990s, an economic development model was implemented to generate an unequal appropriation of socially produced wealth, as concluded from the study carried out on the Tax Reform. , the Labor Reform, the Health and Social Security Reform, and the Gini Coefficient. (Diaz & A., 2009)

On the one hand, the social and democratic state of law promotes the welfare state's development. It vindicates human dignity, work, people's solidarity, and the prevalence of the general interest (social integration). To preserve these principles, the State must intervene in the social order to guarantee economic and social rights, essentially the minimum material conditions for a decent life such as health, education, housing, food, salary, among others. (Diaz & A., 2009)

On the other hand, the neoliberal economic model promotes a minimal State's development and vindicates individual freedom, private property, free trade, and non-intervention of the State in the economy (systemic integration). The minimal State that promotes neoliberalism has mainly the functions of protecting citizens' freedoms from internal violence and external threat, the administration of justice, that is, preserving law and order, promoting competitive markets, and protecting both individual security such as private property. (Diaz & A., 2009)

Finally, the Colombian State has gradually reduced its intervention in the economy and implemented a policy of privatization of some of its functions and assets. However, some analysts state that Colombia benefits from liberalization and openness (except for a bilateral tariff elimination with China), leading to increased real wages for skilled and unskilled workers. However, when comparing the different scenarios, simulation modalities, skilled and unskilled workers' purchasing power increases more when all kinds of trade restrictions are removed. Summarizing the results, we could see that Colombia's international trade strategy must focus on trade liberalization. Furthermore, Latin American integration seems to be the best in improving national welfare and its distribution among factors. In short, the Colombian strategy could be in line with Argentina's if the country decides to liberalize further (Depetris & Ramos, 2012)

3. Market economy, social chaos, and protection system reforms for development.

The period of openness are marked by conflicts between systemic and social integration. The transition implemented through this processes generates the instabilities for the legitimization of the modern nations. In one hand, the social and democratic state of law/socialist states promotes the welfare state's development. It vindicates human dignity, work, people's solidarity, and the prevalence of the general interest (social integration). To preserve these principles, the State must intervene in the social order to guarantee economic and social rights, essentially the minimum material conditions for a decent life such as health, education, housing, food, salary, among others. (Diaz & A., 2009)

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This tension between the social state of law and neoliberalism, understood as a crisis of social integration and systemic integration, was objectified in power relations, which are fundamental to understand the changes presented in the 1990s with respect to the economy and the State.

A new conventional wisdom emerged that social policy was a public investment that should strengthen economic growth and national competitiveness in world markets. In fact, in the (classical) logic of social security, economic development is a precondition for expanding social security. Here, the ultimate goals are social inclusion, poverty eradication, redistribution, equality, and the creation of equal opportunities. In the (new) logic of growth-competition-innovation, social security is essential to promote the national economy.

4. CHINA

Social policies facilitated China's socialist type of neoliberal-looking market reform and contributed to increasing insecurities for many people. As economic policies in the 1980s and 1990s introduced labor markets and dramatically increased the population's numbers (and proportion) in the informal sector, planned-economy systems of social protection and provision collapsed or were eroded (Duckett, 2020)

There was an increase in the financial problems of the former SOE based system and the costs to take care of unemployed workers or those made redundant in a system that was prioritizing privatizations. Welfare demand augmented and left the government unable to provide even for those formerly covered, and the new marketable tools remain in the conflict between systemic and social integration. Reforms were guided by pragmatism and fundamentalism from ramifications of the Mao system. Secondly, along with this, the gradual evolution of Hukou restrictions to attract cheap rural labor into the booming economic centers and the land reform led to rural to urban labor migration on an unprecedented scale. In China the internal migrations kept floating, and was excluded entirely from entitlements to social protection benefits, which imposes a huge social challenge on the government as social instability increased. (Sander, Schmitt, & Kuhnle, 2012)

"Planning-era rural communes were abolished, and urban work units — that had provided job security and 'cradle to grave' social benefits — were gradually dismantled. The household registration (hukou) system that had strictly segregated rural and urban dwellers and defined their social provisioning was eroded. This urban-rural divide was then further weakened by extending social policies to migrant workers in the formal sector and, for the first time, creating entitlements to health insurance and pensions for rural dwellers. However, a new, means-tested social assistance program, the 'Minimum Livelihood Guarantee' (MLG), was implemented highly selectively and intrusively. It was mostly only for the 'deserving' poor with disabilities or unable to work. It has thus segregated the poorest into a stigmatized underclass." (Sander, Schmitt, & Kuhnle, 2012)

Before the founding of the People's Republic Shattered by marketization. A State tradition existed to provide social welfare with a strong patriarchal notion and as a means to maintain (social) control. This resource was used back to way before Mao, Chinese leaders, analists, and scholars promoted a return to the old values of collectivism and welfare, most prominently reflected in the aim to install a harmonious society, as we shall outline below. (Croll, 1999 cited in (Sander, Schmitt, & Kuhnle, 2012)

As a result of these measures, China has shifted quickly from a low-income to an upper-middle-income country, as defined by the World Bank. The proportion of the population living in extreme poverty (on less than US$ 1.90 per day, 2011 dollars at PPP) fell from 66 percent in 1990 to 0.7 percent in 2015, while the proportion below the World Bank's upper-middle-income country poverty line of less than 1US$ 5.50 per day fell from 98 percent to 27 percent. China is, therefore, sometimes portrayed as a model for other authoritarian or developing countries. Since the 1980s, and much more actively since the early 2000s, the Chinese government has thus sought to address this challenge through a wide range of reforms in all fields of social policy. (Sander, Schmitt, & Kuhnle, 2012)

Practically all international aid agencies supported the privatization of health services in developing countries. Expressions such as "managing" and "steering the wheel are better than rowing used in policy documents on the global agenda for health sector reform of the World Bank and the World Health Organization (WHO), refer to the desired characteristics in this new public-private partnership.

It is widely acknowledged, for example, by official WHO reports, that, given the general awkwardness of rural China in terms of economic development, the system provided a remarkably high quality of medical services that were clearly superior to the levels found in comparable developing countries. (Sander, Schmitt, & Kuhnle, 2012)

In 1998, the central government issued a document that established a unified urban health care scheme compulsory for all urban employees, regardless of the type of enterprise. It has a social pooling component and an individual account and requires both employers and employees to pay payroll-based contributions. There are predefined caps on per capita health expenditure, and workers have to make individual payments to contribute to treatment costs. To address the problem of health care services for those urban residents not covered by the employment-based scheme, the central government has introduced a pilot program in 2007, establishing a voluntary Basic Urban Resident Medical Insurance Scheme targeted at including those without work and flexible work patterns, the large group of people.

The development of the urban pension system in the late 1990s and early 2000s was characterized by a gradual transformation from a purely SOE-focused system into an increasingly universal scheme. Coverage was extended from SOE workers, the pension system's traditional constituency, to all urban workers, irrespective of the company's ownership structure, by the SC's decisions of 1995 and 1997. Shortly after that, the increasingly unified and standardized pension schemes were made accessible

There still is no unified pension system for rural areas, which are therefore characterized by voluntary, poorly funded, and largely privatized and locally fragmented schemes with meager coverage of the population.

In terms of social assistance schemes, experimentation, and policy, innovation first started on the local level. The Minimum Standard of Living Scheme (MSLS), pioneered by Shanghai in 1993 provided basic living support to urban households that fell below a predefined poverty threshold. In 2006, the government announced its intention to establish the MSLS in the countryside for rural residents and decided to support the local authorities charged with running the scheme by contributing to its funding. In 2007, 15 million rural residents received benefits within the MSLS-framework. However, full coverage of the rural population turns out to be extremely difficult to achieve for a variety of administrative, economic, and financial reasons and rural benefit-levels remain extremely low.

To preserve social stability and to facilitate the transformation of overstaffed SOEs to modern corporations by allowing them to get rid of redundant workers, the government set up an unemployment insurance system for SOE-employees in 1986 security not as an obligation or based on specific rights (Sander, Schmitt, & Kuhnle, 2012)

5. COLOMBIA

With the Health and Social Security Reform, Law 100 of 1993, the provision of health and pension services was directed no longer through a public entity such as Social Security, as was the case in the old system, but now is guided by a network of public and private entities, governed by criteria of profitability and economic efficiency, with which the criterion of protection of the rights to health and pensions enunciated by the Political Constitution did not prevail, but rather the gradual privatization of social security services in Colombia.

Law 100 provided the legal framework for creating decentralized social health insurance with universal coverage, based on the principles of equity, solidarity, efficiency, quality, and community participation. This ambitious proposal was made possible by discovering oil, which provided the financial capacity to introduce a reform —in capital letters—.10 Two systems were created:

- The contributory regime for those who can pay it, mainly those who have formal employment, contributes 12% of their salary for health insurance. Health promotion companies (EPS) receive a per capita fee adjusted according to age, sex, and geographic location. The Mandatory Health Plan, administered by the EPS, covers a complete package of health interventions.

- The subsidized regime, which covers the rest of the population, is financed with income from the contributory and state subsidies. The capitation payment and the attached package of services offered were arbitrarily set at 50% of the contributory regime's value. The administrators of the subsidized regime (ARS) are responsible for managing this scheme (de Groote, de Paepe, & Unger, 2007)

A national survey (the System for the Selection of Beneficiaries of Government Social Programs, Sisbén) evaluated the population's socioeconomic level. It categorized it into six strata (with 1 being the poorest and 6 the richest). Those who belonged to strata 3 to 6 would join the contributory regime, and the subsidized regime would welcome strata 1 and 2. This in theory; In practice, 13.7% of those who were not poor were in the subsidized regime, and 10.7% of the poor population joined the contributory regime.

The institutions that provide health services (IPS) and public hospitals and health centers (social enterprises of the state, ESE), which were previously autonomous, were contracted by the insurance entities to provide health services. EPS and ARS IPS could be public or private or mixed and for-profit or not. The state assumed the leading role of policy formulation, monitoring, and evaluation, freeing itself almost entirely from offering services directly. The exceptions were activities with high externalities (mainly disease control programs) and health services provision.

Through the reform of social security, especially with the creation of the individually funded system, the requirements for retirement were increased; thus, the age for both men and women was extended by two years and the contribution weeks to be able to make use of the pension; Similarly, through the reform of the health system, the contribution amount was increased from 7% to 12% of the base salary quoted. With this, a social security system was created, operated, and administered by public and private entities that have gradually begun to convert the relationship between citizen and State into a relationship between client and company.

With the Labor Reform, Law 50 of 1990, the labor force's cost was mainly reduced: with the regulation and operation of temporary employment agencies and the creation of fixed-term contracts of less than one year, labor costs and the movement, rotation, and replacement of workers were guaranteed.

With the declaration of company unit only after 10 years of administrative, operational or commercial activities between a branch of production, plant or factory with the main unit, the possibility of subcontracting between the main unit with the subsidiaries was created at a lower cost, for example, as happens today with associative work cooperatives.

Finally, eliminating the retroactivity of unemployment and eliminating overtime for night work and holidays reduced the expenses of the employers and the workers' income. With the Gini Coefficient study, it was confirmed that there was a greater concentration of wealth during the nineties as illustrated in Graphs 3 and 43 since in the 90's, the concentration of income was increased rapidly. In 1994, while the poorest 20% received 2.9% of national income, the richest 20% concentrated 62.3% of total income (UNDP, CEPAL, DNP, 2005: 20).cited in (de Groote, de Paepe, & Unger, 2007)

On June 28th, 2000, Conpes document 3081 established "Familias en Acción", the conditional cash transfer program, authorizing the Government to request loans of up to 320 million dollars from multilateral financial institutions. In this sense, the program was expanded five years later through Conpes document 3359 of June 17th, 2005, which authorized to request a foreign loan of 85 million dollars to consolidate the program.

This program began as a recovery measure to mitigate the impact of the recession that started in Colombia in 1999. In this sense, Conpes document 3081 born as "part of the Strategy for Economic and Social Recovery, designed to mitigate the impact of the recession and fiscal policy measures on the most vulnerable population.

Since the 1990s, the design and provision of social protection in Colombia have undergone substantial changes. In general, these transformations seem to reflect a regional (Latin America) trend to combine selective enforcement of constitutionally protected economic, social and cultural rights, with a reliance on conditional cash transfers to increase the effectiveness of the state to channel social services to segments of society who were excluded before. At the same time, scholars and policymakers in the development field have identified that the design and provision of social policies in Latin America is part of a series of institutional transformations towards the construction and consolidation of a new conception of the role of the state in the development process. (Alviar, 2010)

In Colombia, social policies implemented to combine conditional cash transfers and constitutional adjudication have a marginal effect on improving the life conditions of its beneficiaries or the economy's structural characteristics, as measured by rates of inequality, unemployment, and informality. (Alviar, 2010)

CONCLUSIONS

The conceptions of social welfare from Colombia to china differ in the construction of the concept. East Asian social welfare has the special characteristic provided by Confucianism, where family values, social closer attachments, and the authority as a social stability provider mark this idea. Nevertheless Colombia has strong family values constructed from the catholic rhetoric, but that can offer filial pieti in the South American country.

The period of economic reforms under the IMF and the World Bank led to the breaking of this social contract with a reduction of the state in terms of social services and a resulting increase in poverty and decrease in social welfare. The recipes of the IFIs were designed in a policy reform package known as structural adjustment programs (SAPs) and stabilization typical of the IMF and World Bank.

It is important to mention the regime differences between Colombia and China, one democratic, the other a one-party system. Even with this regime differences, these states were thriving through chaos in order to give back certain welfare provisions that the former economical system permitted in the closed economies.

Certainly, China has been much successful applying the principle widely emerged that social policy was a public investment that should strengthen economic growth and national competitiveness in world markets. In fact, in the (classical) logic of social security, economic development is a precondition for expanding social security. While Colombia is stil thriving through chaos in a system that left the social assistance in Conditional Cash Transfers that work as an electoral tool for political leaders.

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